

# TRIDENT

UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

NOVEMBER 1972

75



CONFLICT. THE POLITICAL SOLDIER AND THE STATE



# TRIDENT



NOVEMBER  
1972  
Volume 50  
Number 1

## IN THIS ISSUE

From the Editor . . . . .	2
Conflict: The Political Soldier and the State by R. L. Wright '73	3
The Saga of the Fram . . . . .	12
by Capt. F. V. Rigler, USN (Ret.)	
The Pueblo Incident—A Study in Concept . . . . .	18
by Ens. R. D. Smith, USN	
On the Ways—A Survey of Allied Warships Planned for the Seventies . . . . .	24
by T. J. McKearney '73	
What's New . . . . .	29
Trident Photo Quiz . . . . .	30

Circulation over 5600

THE PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE OF THE BRIGADE OF MIDSHIPMEN

*Editor-in-Chief* RICK WRIGHT '73  
*Associate Editor* PRESTON EASLEY '74  
*Business Manager* TERRY MCKEARNEY '73  
*Circulation Editor* SCOTT MARSTON '76  
*Advertising Editor* MIKE DOUGLAS '75  
*Officer Representative:* LT. M. D. HASKINS, U.S.N.

Office of Publication: Bancroft Hall, Annapolis, Md. © (Copyright, 1972 by the Trident Magazine). Published four times annually; November, February, April, and June by the Trident Magazine of the United States Naval Academy, Md. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Annapolis, Md., with additional entry at the Post Office at Baltimore, Md., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rate \$2.50 for four issues. Advertising rates on request.

*The opinions expressed herein are exclusively those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U. S. Navy, the U. S. Naval Academy, or Trident magazine.*

## FROM THE EDITOR—

It is interesting to note what the phrase "*Trident*, the Professional Magazine of the Brigade of Midshipmen" means to different people. For about half of the Brigade, when they see the word "professional," visions of Room N, Luce Hall, YP's in freezing weather, and 7th period lectures dance through their heads. Consequently, *Trident* gathers dust for a few days and then is thrown out with the *Post* sports section following a Navy victory in any sport.

The other half of the Brigade looks at *Trident* for different reasons. The quick \$5 if one knows his Navy, perhaps a cursory glance at the pictures (sorry, no cuties in this one), or maybe even a little reading if the article is particularly interesting. Perhaps ten or twenty midshipmen read *Trident* from cover-to-cover, along with *Proceedings*, *Navy Times*, and *All Hands*. But, even as Editor, I can hardly be so naive as to presuppose that *Trident* is as interesting to over four thousand young men as the *Log*, *Sports Illustrated*, or that thick magazine that comes once-a-month in a green envelope.

But somebody, somewhere, reads *Trident* or at least knows about it. A glance at my normally vacant mail slot on Monday reveals promotional material sent that could fill an edition of *Esquire*. Addressed to "Society Editor," "Features Editor," "College News Editor," or a myriad of other titles, included are photos, press releases, and offers from Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Women's Liberation, Alan Cranston, Committee to Re-Elect the President, Millions for McGovern Club, STP, the Army, the Republic of South Vietnam, and the Chamber of Commerce. A lot of people may not read *Trident*, but somebody certainly thinks we've got an audience.

How to increase the readership? Perhaps *Trident* should be read along with the Brigade Bulletin at morning quarters. Or maybe we could pass it out at a Forrestal Lecture or a "spontaneous" pep rally. Or maybe we should just cancel the magazine and buy every member of the Brigade a couple of subs.

No, that probably wouldn't work. So we'll go on printing articles that *Webster's* defines as "pertaining or appropriate to a vocation requiring knowledge of some department of learning or science." Like it or not, *Trident* is here to stay. All of which makes *Trident*, even without Andy Granatelli, et al., the Professional Magazine of the Brigade of Midshipmen.

R. L. W.



# Conflict: The Political Soldier and the State

By MIDN. R. L. WRIGHT '73

At 1:00 A.M. on April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman delivered a statement to reporters who had been called to the White House:

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East.

The dismissal of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the most decorated soldier in American history, precipitated the gravest and most emotional constitutional crisis the United States government has faced since the Great Depression. This crisis transcended regional boundaries and affected everyone from the farmer in the Midwest to the senators and representatives in the hallowed halls of Congress. Effigies of Truman and Secretary of State Acheson were burned in Oklahoma, a man was killed in Seattle for daring to support the President's action, and responsible members of Congress called for impeachment of the Chief Executive.

The reason for this emotional outburst had more to do with the war in Korea than with the conflict between the President and the General. The optimism that followed World War II, that it was a "war to end all wars," quickly turned to disillusionment as the realities of the Cold War made themselves apparent. Truman's policy of containment, first enunciated in the Truman Doctrine of 1946, when applied to Korea, seemed to many Americans to be a meaningless waste of lives. The American philosophy towards war of "let's get in and get it over with" was represented by MacArthur, who wrote in a letter to House Majority Leader Martin, "My views follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with counterforce, and we have never failed to do so in the past . . . there is no substitute for victory."

To the American people, Douglas MacArthur had been dismissed because he wanted to end the war in Korea the American way—total effort for total victory. Yet, the issue at stake was of greater significance than the outcome of Korea. The principle of civilian control of the military is firmly embedded in the structure of the United States Constitution. What MacArthur tried to do was change American foreign policy through his military position in the Far East. An at-

tempt to usurp the powers vested in the President by the Constitution resulted in the General's dismissal.

The Truman Administration failed to convey to the American public the real reason why MacArthur was dismissed. As Matthew Ridgeway has written, "Had the principle of civilian authority vs. military authority stood alone, stripped of the false issues and trivia with which design and accident surrounded it, I believe the majority of the American people would have instantly supported the President."

This article will not fully examine the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Instead, it will consider the inevitable conflict between the political soldier and the state, as related in Major General Courtney Whitney's *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History*.

## From Bataan to Tokyo


Whitney's book begins with MacArthur in the Philippines at the outbreak of World War II. However, for the purposes of this article, a brief look at MacArthur's career prior to 1941 is required.

Douglas MacArthur was a political soldier. Though he was no Cromwell or Ludendorff, he took more than a passing interest in politics, and often used his prestige to influence civilian policy decisions. Huntington has written, "MacArthur has been a brilliant soldier but always something more than a soldier; a controversial, ambitious, transcendent figure, too able, too assured, too talented to be confined within the limits of professional function and responsibility."

Like Patton, MacArthur surrounded his profession with a romanticism, believing that war was justified on moral grounds to preserve Western culture. In 1932, he had made an elaborate exercise of evicting the Bonus Marchers from Pennsylvania Avenue, fearing that Communists within the group of unemployed would topple the government.

The year 1941 found MacArthur in Manila, living





*Meeting of the minds: President Roosevelt discusses Pacific strategy with General MacArthur (left), Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral Leahy (right) at Pearl Harbor, August 1944. FDR so skillfully handled the Army officer that Truman had no idea of the "MacArthur problem" when he became president.*

the life of a retired general of the U.S. Army, but Field Marshal of the Philippine Army by an act of the Philippine Assembly. Recalled to active service by President Roosevelt on July 27, MacArthur readied the Islands for the expected Japanese onslaught. But a lack of supplies and little support from other U.S. forces had doomed the Islands.

Following the Philippine debacle and his famous "I shall return" statement, MacArthur became almost a mythical hero to the American public in the darkest days after Pearl Harbor. Yet, because of MacArthur's distrust of the civilian leaders of the government (a position which Whitney supports with pages describing the lack of support and rapport between Washington and the Far Eastern World War II command), there arose in the Pacific Theater in the latter days of the war the "MacArthur problem." This "problem" was the General's scorn of politicians and his compulsive drive to be always alone, supreme and unfettered by the chains of civilian control.

Roosevelt regarded MacArthur and the Governor-Senator-Dictator of Louisiana, Huey Long, as the "two most dangerous men in America because of their authoritarian tendencies." Yet Roosevelt so skillfully handled his commander in the Pacific, that Truman had no idea of the "MacArthur problem" when death put

the man from Missouri in the White House.

Following V-J day, MacArthur was put in command of the occupation forces in Japan. During the four and a half years of his rule from Tokyo, MacArthur was called upon to perform the functions of a five-star general and the principal American political officer in the Far East. Because of his extensive experience in that area of the world, Truman permitted the "Arkansas mikado" to do pretty much as he pleased.

Still, MacArthur got into trouble in 1949, when he blacklisted twenty-four persons, including every effective Communist leader in Japan, forbidding them to publicly speak, write, or engage in any efforts to support a political cause. Ignoring words of restraint from Washington, MacArthur moved swiftly to smash the Communist Party in Japan.

Criticism of the General was stilled when North Korean divisions launched a surprise attack into South Korea on June 25, 1950. President Truman, interpreting the U.N. resolution calling upon member nations to "render every assistance" as an authorization to assist the South Korean militarily, directed MacArthur to support the defenders with the Navy and Air Force and to defend the island of Formosa against a possible attack from mainland China. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur had entered his last war.



## Soldier Vs. President

Whitney maintains that MacArthur was opposed to sending Americans into South Korea: "Had MacArthur been asked for his advice at the time of this decision (to enter the Korean War), he would have pointed out clearly the risks of Russian and Chinese involvement." Other evidence supports the contention that MacArthur had reversed his previous stance on the glories of war during his occupation duty in Japan. He had banned the maintenance of armed forces in Japan and proclaimed the United States' "readiness to abolish war in concert with the great powers of the world."

However, as Huntington points out, "an underlying consistency existed between MacArthur's earlier and later views on war. War was always a total, cataclysmic act." Thus, after MacArthur observed the early fighting in Korea from an airplane, he made his recommendation to the President: "The only assurance for holding the present line and the ability to regain later the lost ground is through the introduction of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area."

Within twenty-four hours, Truman authorized MacArthur to use ground troops in Korea. Stemming the Communist invasion, MacArthur planned the am-

phibious assault on Inchon, which would prove successful, and MacArthur's last victory. For the General was fighting in a war different from others he had participated in. Korea was a limited war, a war in which the final objective was not complete, unconditional surrender, a war in which the full power and resources of the United States (e.g.—atomic weapons), would not be mobilized and employed to achieve total victory. Korea was a political war, a fact which none of the American commanders in Korea realized except Ridgeway. MacArthur resented the fact that he could not pursue victory in the "traditional" American way. It was the restraint imposed upon MacArthur that led him to publicly criticize the Administration's policy towards the war. These limits on MacArthur's war-making powers, when they conflicted with the General's determination to meet with "maximum counterforce" the enemy, appeared to be appeasement.

The first public statement against the Administration's policy came after MacArthur visited Formosa, against the wishes of Truman who wanted the Nationalist Chinese kept out of the conflict. When the State Department complained that MacArthur was deviating from the government policy with regards to the Island, MacArthur replied, "This visit has been maliciously



*General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Far Eastern Command and Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker arrive at a Korean airfield prior to MacArthur's departure for Tokyo after U.S. ground troops have been committed to the Korean fight.*



misrepresented to the public by those who invariably in the past have propagandized a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific."

Whitney maintains that MacArthur had stumbled upon a British-State Department plan to desert the Nationalist government on Formosa. Shortly after MacArthur's outburst against "appeasement," MacArthur was forced to withdraw a statement he had made to the Veterans of Foreign Wars about Korea because in the Secretary of Defense's words, "Various features of the statement with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States."

The Formosan problem, says Whitney, "gave MacArthur his first clear illustration of the devious workings of the Washington-London team." If the General honestly thought that the civilian authorities were conspiring against him, he should have resigned. However, he did not, and returned to Tokyo, his scorn of politicians rekindled.

Truman dispatched Averell Harriman to Tokyo to patch things up with his Far East Commander. Upon his return to the United States, Harriman was questioned over the possibility that MacArthur and the President did not agree on important aspects of Far Eastern policy. Harriman, obviously angered at this line of questioning, snapped, "I tell you, General MacArthur is a soldier and will carry out any orders the President gives him." Having revealed his thoughts more than he had intended, Harriman refused to make any further comment on the matter. Later, however, Harriman commented, "He (MacArthur), accepted the President's position and will act accordingly but without full conviction."

In an attempt to establish better relations between the White House and Tokyo, Truman flew to Wake Island to meet, for the first time, America's most decorated soldier. Whitney dismisses the Wake meeting as a "sly political ambush . . . by which the President was able to establish a connection between his administration and the military strategy . . . which had won the great victory at Inchon."

The meeting at Wake accomplished little, and any hopes that Truman and MacArthur's ideas were in concert evaporated when the Chinese launched their attacks across the 38th parallel, almost destroying the U.S. 8th Army. MacArthur had previously maintained that the Chinese would not intervene (a turnabout from his original message to Truman when he pointed out the risks of Russian and Chinese involvement), and his offensive drive into North Korea had not been prepared for the Chinese onslaught. Whitney defends his General by claiming that the Red Chinese only decided to attack after they became aware of the restraints placed on MacArthur by the President. Principal among those was the denial of permission to bomb the Yalu River bridges, bridges that afforded an avenue for supplies and reinforcements to reach the North Korean forces.

It is not within the realm of this paper to discuss the merits of the military strategy that was pursued in Korea. But, when MacArthur resorted to the device of using the sudden enemy threat of the destruction of American forces as a lever to obtain a change of orders, he violated a fundamental principle of command relations. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President believed that MacArthur was trying to impose his own



Scale model reproductions of any U. S. and many foreign ships in brass and poplar with polished wood base.

Each model is a faithful copy of the actual ship custom built to your specifications. Decks are detailed with numerous metal fittings and masts, radar, and other details are soldered brass assemblies. Cases are available.

All models are equal to the quality and appearance of those pictured.

Any Gearing or Sumner class destroyer, about 18" long, in present day rig \$165.00, including shipping and insurance. Gearing, Sumner or Fletcher in World War II rig \$180.00. World War II submarines are \$145.00, approximately 15" long.

Additional scales and details available. Fifty percent deposit with your order. Satisfaction guaranteed.

## THE SHIP MODEL SHOP

BOX 383 - ALLSTON AVE. - EASTHAM, MASS. 02642

Telephone: 617-255-5375





*Lt. Gen. Shepherd, USMC, VAdm. Struble, Gen. MacArthur, and Brig. Gen. Whitney, USA, make pre-invasion inspection of landing areas at Inchon from Struble's launch. The Inchon landing would prove successful, but would not provide*

political ideas upon the government of the United States through the guise of "military necessity."

Surprisingly, MacArthur's recommendations did not ask for more support of his command in the face of the Chinese threat. Instead he wanted extensive bombing of mainland China, particularly Manchuria, a blockade of the country, permission to unleash Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces on Peking, and permission to destroy the Yalu River bridges. The General desired a change of U.S. policy in the war, a change that the government did not feel would be in the best interests of the United States and the United Nations.

MacArthur had complete faith in his own judgment and brilliance. Buoyed by his military success at Inchon, he was determined to carry the war to the enemy as he desired, using the traditional prerogatives of the field commander to accomplish the mission in any way he saw fit. These traditional prerogatives caused the Joint Chiefs to send MacArthur many dubious and unclear directives as to a policy to pursue. Whitney claims that from the period of the Chinese offensive to his stepdown from command, MacArthur operated in a policy vacuum. The General fervently believed when he testified in the Senate hearings, "There is no policy! There is nothing, I tell you, no plan,

no anything . . . I was operating in what I call a vacuum. I could hardly be in opposition to policies which I was not even aware of. I don't know what the policy is now."

Matthew Ridgeway maintains that "at no time, except briefly after the first success and again after the pull-back from the Yalu, did we operate in a mission vacuum or without specific political or military objectives."

In this writer's opinion, Whitney's assertion that MacArthur was unable to get definite policy directives from Washington is not without substance. The National Security Council never advised the General of a contingency plan in case of Chinese intervention. He was instructed not to fully "commit" himself if the Chinese invaded, but no strict definition of "commit" was given. With no strict policy from Washington, MacArthur suggested his own way of defeating the enemy; when these ways were vetoed from above because they would get America deeper into a mainland Asia war, the General publicly criticized the Administration's policies that were implemented instead.

On March 20, 1952, MacArthur was informed that President Truman would soon announce that the United Nations would be willing to discuss terms to end the conflict. Truman would call on the Chinese Communists





*Korea was a limited war, a war in which the final objective was not complete, unconditional surrender, a war in which the full power and resources of the United States would not be mobilized and employed to achieve total victory.*

to cease fire and begin discussing terms for a settlement that would ease the political tension in the Far East.

On March 24th, MacArthur issued his "military appraisal" of the situation. After summarizing the United Nations' tactical successes and the inability of the Red Chinese to supply their forces, MacArthur suggested that if Red China would not submit to United Nations terms, he would invade Red China:

The enemy must now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

MacArthur was in effect calling upon the Red Chinese to admit defeat, something which he knew Peking would never do. He was ensuring rejection of any program the President would offer, by transforming it into a demand for surrender. At the same time, MacArthur's "departure from the U.N.'s tolerant effort" implied sanctions that neither Washington nor the United Nations wanted to apply.

Consequently, the White House's announcement was cancelled and President Truman would later write, "If I allowed him (MacArthur) to defy the civilian authorities in this manner, I myself would be violating my oath to uphold and defend the Constitution . . . Mac-

Arthur left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his insubordination."

Whitney defends MacArthur's "military appraisal" by claiming that "his statement of settling the war without reference to Formosa or the United Nations seat had cut right across one of the most disgraceful plots in American history . . . a plot to change the status of Formosa and the Nationalists' seat in the United Nations."

However, Matthew Ridgeway (who would replace MacArthur) has written of the General's "military appraisal": "No one in possession of the facts could have been so naive as to imagine that MacArthur was either unaware of what effect his announcement might have or innocent of any desire openly to oppose the President."

On April 5th, the Republican Minority Leader in the House, Joseph Martin, publicized a letter MacArthur had written to him, expressing dissatisfaction with the limitation of the war to Korea. The General's public dissatisfaction with the Administration's concept of how the Communist offensive would be turned back would be his last challenge to the government as a military officer.

On April 11th, President Truman dismissed General MacArthur from all his commands—as United Nations Commander; United States Commander in Chief, Far East; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in



Batteries of rockets are unleashed on an important enemy marshalling yard by U.S. Air Force B-26 light bombers during operations in North Korea. MacArthur requested the use of air power against the Yalu River bridges—a request that was turned down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



Japan; and Commanding General, United States Army, Far East. Douglas MacArthur was a civilian.

### The Civil-Military Relationship

Why was MacArthur dismissed? To many Americans it seemed to be because he wanted a real victory in Korea, a victory which the Truman Administration for some reason did not want to occur. Charges of Communists in the State Department and a Washington-London anti-MacArthur plot (which Whitney supports in his book) were voiced by many in the United States. A Congress hostile to the Administration started the "MacArthur hearings" which would expand into an examination of all United States foreign policy before it was concluded.

During the hearings, Secretary of Defense George Marshall testified as to why the General had been dismissed:

What brought about the necessity for General MacArthur's removal is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local Theater Commander publicly expressing his displeasure at, and his disagreement with the foreign policy of the United States. He had grown so far out of sympathy with the established policies of the United States that there is grave doubt as to whether he could any longer be permitted to exercise the authority in making decisions that normal command functions would assign to a Theater Commander.



*In late 1950 U.S. Marines drive forward after effective close air support by F4U-5 Corsairs. To the Leatherneck in battle, it made no difference if Korea was only a limited war. He still fought, bled and died as he had in the total war effort of two previous world wars.*



*U.S. Marines dive for cover as a Navy combat cameraman records the shuddering blast of a Red 82 millimeter shell on a Korean ridge.*

Throughout the rest of his narrative, Whitney considers neither the idea that MacArthur had tried to remake American foreign policy or the charges that MacArthur was guilty of insubordination. But some of Whitney's colleagues in uniform did not ignore these charges. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed with Truman that MacArthur was guilty of insubordination. Bradley viewed the General's pronouncements as a breach of discipline for which he should be dismissed. George Marshall, the first professional soldier to hold the post of Secretary of Defense, after going over all the messages that MacArthur had sent to Washington in the last two years, concluded that the General should have been fired in 1950. Ridgeway contended that MacArthur had come "close" to insubordination and Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman testified before the Senate committee, "Throughout this period the conduct of affairs was made difficult by a lack of responsiveness (of MacArthur) to the obvious intentions of the directives which were transmitted out there (to Tokyo) and a tendency to debate and in certain cases to criticize."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave two reasons why MacArthur was dismissed. They contended that by his public statements MacArthur had shown that he was "not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea . . . it was necessary to have a commander more responsive to control from Washington."





The second reason was that MacArthur had failed to comply with a presidential memorandum of 6 December 1950, which instructed all theatre commanders to clear their public statements with the State Department before releasing them to the press. The Joint Chiefs charged that by flouting this directive, MacArthur had successfully challenged the President's ability to make a Korean peace overture.

Matthew Ridgeway contends that the President's 6 December directive was superfluous. He states that "it is never within the province of the soldier, under our Constitution to make foreign policy. That is solely, specifically, and properly a function of elected officials, regardless of anyone's assessment of the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of current policy."

Despite Whitney's failing to see the constitutional question involved with his leader's actions, others, including some Republican politicians and newspapermen normally hostile to the Administration, supported the President in his move to uphold the Constitution. Thomas Dewey, Truman's 1948 Republican opponent, released a statement to the press: "I do not challenge the power or the right of the President under the Constitution to relieve a military commander."

Representative James Duff of Pennsylvania, in a speech in the House of Representatives, pointed out the constitutional issue:

Supreme authority in the Armed Forces must reside somewhere. Under the Constitution of the United States it resides in the President as Commander-in-Chief. To permit a continuous dispute as to authority and military policy at the most critical juncture in our history is unthinkable.

MacArthur's dismissal divided the armed forces into

two camps: those that supported the President's action, and those that contended that MacArthur's total effort for total victory formula was the only way to approach the Korean conflict, and his dismissal was a betrayal of these traditional American principles. From Bradley and Ridgeway's pronouncements, it is obvious that MacArthur never had "the Army" behind him. While many agreed with his position, the General did not represent a particular military interest. Still, it was clear that political loyalties determined whom many of the military officers supported. To many, this was a constitutional danger. Walter Lippman, in his April 30th column, wrote that this was an "intolerant thing in a Republic; namely a schism within the armed forces between the generals of the Democratic Party and the generals of the Republican Party."

Courtney Whitney never considers the constitutional question of a military officer making his country's foreign policy. The last chapters of his book defend MacArthur's military strategy but never discuss whether the General was right or wrong in his public opposition to the President. Whitney misses the crux of the MacArthur dismissal: no government can tolerate a military officer who challenges its foreign policy publicly. To do so undermines the President's principal responsibility of conducting his country's diplomatic and military strategy.



The muzzle blast of the USS Iowa's 16-inch gun makes a perfect powder puff as her number two turret opens up on the North Korean city of Chongjin. Shore bombardment was within the limits of Truman's limited war—bombing of Red China was not.





*The military man should let his views on policies being considered by the civilian officials be known in the highest councils of the government. However, once the decision is reached on what course to follow, the military officer must execute that policy without hesitation, or resign from the service.*

General MacArthur still believed that he was right in opposing the President's policies, even after his dismissal. Defending his position before the Massachusetts General Court in July, 1951, he said:

*I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of the Armed Forces owe their primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of the government, rather than to the Country and its Constitution they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous. None could cast greater doubt on the integrity of the Armed Forces.*

General MacArthur and Courtney Whitney were mistaken in their belief that an officer owes his primary allegiance to the country and Constitution, rather than to those who "temporarily exercise authority." The Constitution of the United States expresses the supremacy of civilian authorities, elected under the law, over military authorities. The Constitution designates the President as Commander-in-Chief and provides that he shall appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, all military officers. These officers owe allegiance to the President, not an individual loyalty, but rather a loyalty to the office which the man fills. While the loyalty that a military officer owes his superiors should be reciprocated by an equal loyalty from above, the authority of his superiors to issue orders to be carried out cannot be questioned by the military officer.

The Constitution gives civilians control over the military and charges the President with the execution of foreign policy. If a soldier cannot obey the policy espoused by the executive branch of the government, he should resign. If he will not resign, he should be dismissed. It is not the responsibility of the soldier to determine whether the policy is right or wrong. It is his responsibility to implement the policy of his government.

The military man should let his views on policies being considered by the civilian officials be known in the highest councils of the government. However, once the decision is reached on what course to follow, the military officer must execute that policy without hesitation, or resign from the service.

Douglas MacArthur did not agree with the course the Truman Administration plotted for American involvement in Korea. He let his views be known in the highest councils of the United States government. These views were rejected because they appeared not to be in the best interests of the United States or the United Nations. MacArthur's public criticism of United States foreign policy demonstrated that he did not understand the tenets of his profession. It is ironic that the most decorated soldier in American history, a man with more than half a century of illustrious military service, never did fully understand the oath he took upon becoming an officer, or the very phrasing of his commission.

